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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MYRNA FABRIZIO,
Appellant

vs.
Case No. 12596

FIDELITY AND GUARANTY
LIFE INSURANCE COMP ANY,
Respondent

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for payment of death benefits on an
application for insurance brought by the widow of the
deceased Delbert Fabrizio.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The respective parties all filed motions for summary
judgment and the court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted judgment for the defendant.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have her motion for summary judgment granted or in the alternative that the matter be sent
back for trial.

FACTS OF THE CASE
June 27, 1967, Delbert Fabrizio, his wife the Plaintiff,
Myrna Fabrizio, and his mother and father met in the office of the First Security Bank of Utah, Roosevelt Office,
with Paul Murphy, the manager of the bank. Delbert Fabrizio and Plaintiff were delinquent on a loan with the bank
and the purpose of the meeting was to re-negotiate a new
loan and to borrow additional money. The mother and father of Delbert Fabrizio were present because the bank
required additional security and they were deeding to their
son land for such security.
When the Loan had been completed Mr. Murphy, the
bank manager, then urged that credit life insurance be obtained to protect the payment of the loan. The Plaintiff and
her husband had complete confidence and trust in Mr.
Murphy and his recommendations and agreed to discuss life
insurance.
Mr. Murphy was at the time also an officer and stockholder in the Central Utah Insurance Agency and had a
financial interest in the success of the company. The bank
refers as much business as it can to the Central Utah Insurance Agency. A Mr. Gale Holt was called on the phone by
Mr. Murphy and he came to the bank. He explained insurance policies that could be purchased through the Central
Utah Insurance Agency but which would be issued by the
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Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company. An application
for insurance was completed with the Plaintiff, Myrna
Fabrizio, as the beneficiary with the bank's interest being
paid first in case of death.
Delbert Fabrizio did not have at this time the money
to pay the premium so the agent agreed to mail in the application and advance the premium with the understanding
he would be repaid out of the loan proceeds from the bank.
This was done and the application was received by the Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company on June 29, 1967.
The agent explained to Delbert Fabrizio, the deceased,
that a medical examination would be required and the agent
arranged for the examination with the doctors at the Roosevelt Hospital.
The Plaintiff and her mother and father-in-law understood the insurance was in force as of that date. (See Deposition of each).
The medical examination was given June 30, 1967 by
Dr. Buxton and the report was received by the Fidelity and
Guaranty Insurance Company July 5, 1967.
July 12, 1967 the agent, Gale Holt, received a letter
dated July 7, 1967, from the insurance company which indicated that a blood pressure recheck was necessary or
Fabrizio could only be considered at a minimum of the
Table H Rate. (Exhibit No. 6).
The agent wrote to Fabrizio informing him there was
a probable high blood pressure and that the insurance would
cost more money and for him to come to the office and go
over the life insurance program. (See Exhibit No. 3). The
agent did not hear from Fabrizio and wrote other letters
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and attempted to contact him by phone but failed to do so.
About the 7th day of September, 1967, the agent received
from the Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company a letter
stating the case had been filed incomplete and the initial
payment of $75.50 was enclosed with instructions to deliver
the check to the deceased.
On September 9, 1967, Gale Holt and Delbert Fabrizio
met on the streets of Roosevelt, Utah and went to the off ice
of the agent where they discussed the insurance policy and
the blood pressure recheck. The agent informed the deceased the additional premium was only necessary if there
was high blood pressure and that the money would be refunded if there was no high blood pressure. (See Deposition
of Gale Holt Pages 35 and 81-82).
The type of policy available under the rated insurance
program was discussed and agreed upon with an additional
premium of $150.50 being due. Fabrizio again did not have
the premium payment and the agent agreed to advance to
him the premium and the offer was accepted.
Monday, September 11, 1967 Gale Holt phoned the Salt
Lake City office of the defendant insurance company and
was advised to mail in the two checks. The original premium
of $75.50 and the second premium of $150.50 were then forwarded by the agent to the office of Fidelity and Guaranty
Insurance Company by letter.
The agent also requested the office let him know what
else "He should do to keep things going." (See Exhibit
#16)
On Tuesday, September 12th, 1967, the agent again
wrote to the Salt Lake office of Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company and stated, "In our phone call you advised
me to forward the two checks, one for $75.50 and $150.50
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to make a total of $226.00 as the annual premium for a term
policy. Let me know if you need more information on this
pending item. (See Exhibit# 17).
Fabrizio was accidently killed September 12th, 1967,
as he was attempting to unload logs from a truck. The
father of the deceased came to the agent's office about 4 :15
P. M. the same day and gave the agent this information.
This was the first Mr. Holt knew of the death of Mr. Fabrizio.
Charles L. Soelberg, the supervisor of life operation for
Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company, learned Wednesday, September 13th, 1967, on his car radio while going
to work that Fabrizio had been killed. The two premium
checks were received in his office that same day.
On September 14th, 1967, the father of Delbert Fabrizio paid the agent, Gale Holt, $150.00 which the deceased
owed to the agent for money advanced by the agent.
The insurance company tendered back both insurance
premiums about October 18th, 1967 and refused to issue a
policy of life insurance or to pay the insurance applied for.
MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES
POINT I
AMBIGUITIES IN INSURANCE POLICIES AND
BINDERS ARE TO BE CONSTRUED MOST FAVORABLY TOW ARD THE INSURED AND AGAINST THE
INSURER.
The rule of law recognized by generally all jurisdictions
(See Seventh Dicennial Digest, Vol. 17, Insurance, Section
146.7 (1) pp 1296-1309) is that insurance contracts and
conditional receipts are not ordinary contracts but are con-
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tracts of adhesion between parties not equally situated and
having been prepared unilaterally by the insurer, the terms
are to be strictly construed against the insurer and the
interpretation most favorable to the insured is to be chosen.
Allen v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 208 A. 2d
638 (N. J. 1965).
That Utah is consistent with this rule see Jorgensen v.
Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 13 Utah 3d 303 (1962);
Stout v. Washington Fire and Marine Insurance Company,
14 Utah 2d 414 (1963); P. E. Ashton v. Joyner, 17 Utah 2d
162 (1965); Christensen v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,
21Utah2d 194 (1968).
POINT II
CONDITIONS STATED IN THE APPLICATION
AND THE CONDITIONAL RECEIPT MUST BE CONSIDERED TOGETHER AND IF THEY ARE AMBIGUOUS MUST BE CONSTRUED MOST FAVORABLY TOW ARD THE INSURED.
The recent case of Machinery Center, Inc., v. Anchor
Nati01wl Life Insurance Company, 434 F. 2d 1 (10 Cir
1970), which originated in Utah states:
"A binding receipt and the application for insurance are to be construed together.... "
The pertinent language from the application states:
"I agree that no insurance shall take effect unless
and until the policy has been delivered and received
and accepted by me and the first premipm paid during the life of the Proposed Insured and while his
state of health is as stated in the application except
as provided in the Conditional Receipt bearing the
same number as this application if a premium has
been paid as indicated in Item #21 above and such
Receipt issued."

7
The conditional receipt attached to the Exhibit states
the following conditions are to be met before the insurance
is in effect:
" ... Issuance of this receipt does not place any insurance in effect for any period unless the proposed
insured was insurable and acceptable as provided
below.
"Insurance under the terms of this policy applied
and accepted by me and the first premium paid durand supplementary provisions if applied for and
take effect as of the last of any medical examination
or tests required under the rules and practices of
the company or the date of this payment, which
ever shall be the later, provided that on the date the
proposed insured, in the opinion of the company's
authorized officer at its home office, was insurable
and acceptable under the rules and practices of the
company as a standard risk for the policy and/or
supplementary provision in the amount, on the plan
and otherwise exactly as applied for, otherwise there
shall be no liability on the part of the company except to return this payment in the form of the company's check.
The conditional receipt, Exhibit No. 19, which was also
given to the proposed insured, is worded differently but
contains about the same requirements as the conditional
receipt in Exhibit No. 2.
The application contained the following requirements:
1.

Delivery and receipt of the policy by Fabrizio

2.

Acceptance by Fabrizio

3.

During Fabrizio's lifetime
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The conditional receipt imposes these requirements:
1.

Completion of medical examinations or tests required under the rules and practices of the company.

2.

Payment of the premium.

3.

Determination that Fabrizio was insurable and
acceptable under all rules and practices of the company as a standard risk for the policy and amount
exactly as applied for.

The defendant specifically urges that all these conditions must be met before insurance can take effect. A closer
examination of the language on the application reveals that
all the requirements in the application are excepted (" ...
except as provided in the conditional receipt... "). Similar
language in an application was held to be modified by the
language of the conditional receipt in the case of Liberty
Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 175 So. 2d 737 (Ala. 1965).
The plaintiff urges that only the conditions of the conditional receipt are to be met where the applicant has paid
the premium and received a conditional receipt in advance
of the company issuing a policy.
A fact that the plaintiff and the defendant can each
interpret the language to mean differently indicates there
is an ambiguity and the ambiguity should be resolved in
favor of the insured.

In Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 160 F.
2d 599 the court declared that language in an insurance
contract should be construed as it would be understood by
the ordinary applicant for insurance.
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In the recent California case of Young v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 382 the court found that

insurance contracts were ones of adhesion between parties
not equally situated and it was thus incumbent upon the insurer as the dominant and expert party in the field to not
only draft such contracts in unambiguous terms but also to
bring to the attention of the prospective insured all provisions and conditions which create exceptions or limitations
on the coverage. This principle is particularly relevant
where conditional receipts are concerned because the very
acceptance of an advance premium by the agent tends naturally toward an understanding of the immediate coverage
though it be temporarily and terminable. In short, to the
ordinary laymen, payment of the insurance premium constitutes payment for immediate protection and it is unlikely
that one would carefully read the fine print contained in a
receipt.
In the case of Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v.

Hamilton, 237 F. 2d 235 (6 Cir) found:
"A Binding Receipt which recited that if medical
examination was required then insurance shall take
effect on the date of completion of the examination
and in no event shall issuance of such receipt cause
the company to be liable in excess of One Hundred
Thousand ($100,000.00) Dollars and said ~eceipt
also recited that insurance was not to be considered
in force until policy was issued, receipt was ambiguous and was construed to provide a contract for
interim insurance."
Therefore, the conditions that the insured must meet
are those imposed by the conditional receipt i.e. payment of
premium, medical examination, and insurability on the date
of the application or examination.
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POINT III
AMBIGUITY EXISTS AS TO WHAT IS MEANT BY
THE TERM "THE LAST OF ANY MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OR TESTS".
The defendant has stated in its memorandums submitted to the lower court that the decedent, Fabrizio, did
not submit to all the medical examinations or tests required
by the company. Agent Gale Holt in his deposition indicates
that a medical examination with attendant physician was
not required or necessary. Beginning on page 35 of his deposition at line 13 the agent recounts a conversation as follows:
" ... all he had to do was to go to the doctor and get
a blood pressure check. It was not necessary to get
an appointment, one of the girls could do that."
At page 89, line 1 of the agent's deposition he stated
as follows:
" ... probably only take you five or ten minutes to
do it and you don't even need an appointment. You
can go up there and one of the girls can put that on
your arm and you can take the check."
It is obvious that the insured and the agent both un-

derstood that an examination by a licensed physician or
other licensed personnel was not required. Anyone at the
hospital could give the examination. Medical examinations
or medical tests are typically performed by doctors or persons licensed by the State of Utah, not just "one of the
girls".
In Prince v. Western Empire Life Ins. Co., 19 U. 2d
174 (1967), a Dr. Prince had completed two medical exam-
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inations but was killed before further medical information
requested by the insurer was obtained. This court held that
ambiguity existed as to the meaning of
" ... the date of medical examination as stated on
the back of the binding receipt."
In requiring further information in the Prince case,
the insurer appeared to be trying to provide the best rate
possible considering the medical condition of Dr. Prince and
not for the purpose of rejection. In the instant case. Fabrizio had completed a medical examination, the company
was well aware of his medical condition and the additional
tests required by the insurer was not for the purpose of determining insurability, but for the purpose of presenting
Fabrizio with insurance at the best premium rate possible
consistent with his medical condition.
After the insured and the agent met on the 9th of September and the insured had selected a different policy and
paid the premium the agent wrote a letter and indicated
that he had collected the additional premium said:
"Let me know what I should do to keep this thing
going as we want a policy issued as soon as possible." (Exhibit # 16)
The next day the agent wrote again to the Salt Lake
City Office of the defendant insurance company in which
he informed the company he was forwarding two checks
as he had been advised and he again requested additional information as to what he should do and asked if more information is needed by the company. (Exhibit # 17)
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From the above it is amply clear that the agent himself did not believe any medical examination was required
but that only a blood pressure re-check was necessary to
determine the rate that would be charged.
POINT IV
INSURANCE BECOMES EFFECTIVE ON THE
DATE OF APPLICATION OR MEDICAL EXAMINATION IF THE INSURED WAS INSURABLE.
The court stated in Prince v. Western Empire Life
Ins. Co. supra at 179,
"We think that the binding receipt became effective
upon completion of the medical examination ... unless at that time the applicant was not an insurable
risk."
" ... A statement of the trend of the more recent decisions is found in 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, Section
210"
The court in Thorpe v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 286 F.
Supp. 620 (N. D. Ind. 1968) at 626 states:
"Regardless, then, of whether or not any examination is ever taken, if it can be shown that the applicant was insurable, the company should not be heard
to say that failure to take a medical examination (or
consequently, the failure to provide proof of insurability) bars recovery ... We think that to find that
insurance is in full force and effect from the time
the receipt is issued and the premium paid, if the
applicant is found to be insurable in connection with
objective company standards, is the only result
which does substantial justice both to the applicant
and to the insured.
Under the rule adopted by the Utah Court in Prince,
if the applicant was insurable on the date of the examination or application the applicant is insured.
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To not allow the insured this protection would be to
permit the insurer the unconsciouable act of receiving consideration and not having to perform. In Western & Southern Life Ins. v. Vale, 12 N.E. 350 at 353, 354 we find the
following:
"In Starr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 1905, 41 Wash,
228, 232, 83 P. 116, 117, it is pointed out that, if the
company has the right to arbitrarily reject the application in ~he event of death of the applicant before the policy is issued, no benefit is derived from
that portion of the premium which covers the time
between the application and the acceptance and issuance of the policy. This is undoubtedly true, since,
if the company is not bound to pay a loss occurring
in the period, there is no insurance for the period. It
is said, 'The chief object of the provision would,
therefore, seem to be to enable the insurance company to collect premiums for a period during which
there was in fact no insurance and consequently no
risk.'
... In other words, it is recognized that such a receipt is calculated to convey the impression to the
applicant for insurance that he is insured, and to
procure money from him as premium for insurance
over a period when he is not insured at all".

The Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lamme, 425 p.
346, the court stated:
"Nor should a court be obliged to overlook the obvious advantage to the company in obtaining payment of the premium when the application is made.
It is a device to avoid the possibility that the applicant will change his mind and revoke his application,
or deal with a rival company. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Grant, 268 F 2nd 307 (9 Cir. 1959) "A conditional receipt tends to encourage deception. We do
not mean to imply affirmative misconduct by the
soliciting agent. We suggest only that if nothing is
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said about the complicated and legalistic phrasing of
the receipt, and the agent accepts an application for
insuranc~ together with the first premium payment,
the applicant has reason to believe he is insured.
Otherwise, he is deceived."
In this case, the court held that a medical examination
was not necessary as long as the applicant was insurable.

POINT V
FABRIZIO WAS INSURABLE AND ACCEPT ABLE
UNDER THE RULES AND PRACTICES OF THE COMPANY AS A STANDARD RISK FOR THE POLICY AND/
OR SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISION IN THE AMOUNT,
ON THE PLAN AND OTHERWISE EXACTLY AS APPLIED FOR.
The condition that the applicant be insurable and acceptable under the rules and practices of the company as a
standard risk for the policy and/or supplementary provision in the amount, on the plan and otherwise exactly as
applied for is vague and ambiguous and must be construed
most favorable to the insured. (See points I and II above)
Further Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co., supra,
page 601 the court stated:
"An underwriter might so understand the phrase,
when read in its context, but the application was not
to be submitted to the underwriter; it was to go to
persons utterly unacquainted with the niceties of
life insurance who would read it colloquially. It is
the understanding of such persons that counts ...."
It is well to ask what is meant by the term "standard

risk"? Does it mean as applied to the whole assortment of
policies the company offers for sale? Does it only apply
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to a policy or to the policy and amount? And what is the
meaning of the phrase "exactly as applied for"? Fabrizio
was the standard risk for the policy and amount for which
he applied and is included within the definition.
If Fabrizio is not included because the term "standard
risk" is narrowly construed, it must then be held that the
insurer is estopped from relying on this construction or
that it has waived the "standard risk" when they, knowing
at all times of Fabrizio's medical condition:

1.

Offered Fabrizio a choice of three different policies.

2.

Accepted payment for a rated policy.

3.

Did not request additional medical examinations
for the new policy.

Beginning at the top of Page (35) of the deposition of
Gale Holt we read as follows:
"If I pay the $150.00 he says, 'I have still got to
pay that even if my blood pressure goes up?" And I
said, "That's right," and then he indicated that "if I
don't have high blood pressure then I can get my
money refunded," and I said, that's right."
It is clear that this was the understanding of the agent,

Gale Holt and the insured Delbert Fabrizio. It is also clear
from the 'deposition of agent Holt that this was the understanding of Soelberg who supervised the life operations of
the defendant company.
Agent Holt, in his deposition states that he called Mr.
Soelberg on the phone and asked him to explain to him the
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basic rate for the three types of policies that were being
offered. Beginning at Page (47) Line (20) the questions
and answers of Mr. Gale Holt in the deposition are as follows:

Q "Did he tell you that if the additional money was
paid a policy would be issued in any event?"
A "He did not tell me that, no. He told me that this
money would have to be paid if he had high
blood pressure."
Q "Did he give you any assurance that the company would accept Delbert Fabrizio in any
event upon the payment of the money and a
blood pressure re-check, or did he indicate that
this was still to be left up to the acceptance of
the company at the home office?"
A "His indication was that he didn't see any other
problem in Mr. Delbert Fabrizio's health providing that the blood pressure check was taken,
that he would probably have the policy issued
and that if he did have high blood pressure then
he would have to pay the additional payment of
$150.00 but he wanted to know if Mr. Fabrizio,
Delbert Fabrizio, wanted the upgraded insurance. He wanted to know this and to acknowledge that this was the reason we tendered the
$150.50 is because he wanted the insurance."
Q Did Mr. Soelberg indicate that the additional
payment would be necessary in order for them
to continue processing it or something?"
A "He didn't indicate that, no."
Again on Page (81) commencing with line (18) agent
Gale Holt stated as follows :
"My understanding was that the $76.00 was the
base premium. If he were in good health, this
is what the amount would be. If he had high
blood pressure and the company would accept
him then they would charge this additional
amount. In other words they would write the insurance for this amount if he had high blood
pressure."
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Q

A

And if the recheck was showed that he didn't
have high blood pressure was he to get a refund
on his insurance premium?"
He would have got a refund on the $150.00.

The letter from the home office of the defendant insurance company to the Salt Lake City office, which letter
was then forwarded to the agent Gale Holt (Exhibit No.
11) shows that the applicant was an acceptable risk and
insurable under the rules and practices of the company for
the policy which Fabrizio applied for.
POINT VI
THE DEFENDANT FIDELITY AND GUARANTY
INSURANCE COMPANY MADE A NEW OFFER OR INSURANCE TO THE DECEASED WHICH WAS ACCEPTED.
If the court should find that the applicant, Delbert
Fabrizio, was not insured under the policy applied for on
June 27th then the plaintiff takes the alternative position
that the defendant company on the 9th day of September,
1967, offered a new insurance policy to Fabrizio which was
accepted.

At a meeting in the bank at Roosevelt, Utah on June
27th, 1967, Fabrizio signed an application for insurance as
follows:
1.

The amount of the insurance was Twenty Five
Thousand ($25,000.00) Dollars.

2.

The policy was an executive reducing term policy for twenty (20) years.

3.

The premium for this policy was Seventy Five
and 50/100 ($75.50) Dollars.
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The insurance policy offered Fabrizio on September
9th, 1967, which was accepted was as follows:
1.

A policy for twenty five (25) years.

2.

The premium was $226.00.

A letter from the home office to Salt Lake City, Utah
which was forwarded to the agent, Gale Holt, clearly shows
the company was offering other policies to the deceased.
(Exhibit No. 11).
A letter from Gale Holt to the Salt Lake City office of
defendant insurance company, dated September 11th, 1967,
stated that he had collected the premium and sent it in, and
then requests :
"Let me know what I should do to keep this thing
going as we want a policy issued as soon as possible." (Exhibit No. 16).
Nothing was said about an examination or blood pressure since these applied to the policy applied for in June of
1967.
On September 12th, 1967 agent Gale Holt again wrote
to the defendant insurance company requesting it to let
him know if they needed
"-----More information on this pending item." (Exhibit No. 17).
Following this interview with Fabrizio on Saturday
Holt talked by phone on Monday with the defendant in Salt
Lake City, Utah and advised them he had collected the additional premium.
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In Exhibits (No. 16 and No. 17) he ask what else he
should do to complete the matter so the policy could be issued.
QUERY: If an examination was needed for the second
policy why did Gale Holt both phone and write the defendant company asking what else was necessary. Why was he
not informed that a medical examination would be required
with the second insurance policy, and why did he not so
inform Fabrizio?
The answer is that the company knew of the medical
condition of Fabrizio and they were willing to accept him
on the rated premium.
POINT VII
THE CONDITIONAL RECEIPT IS AN INSURABILITY TYPE RECEIPT.
The annotation reported at 8 ALR 2d, 943, discusses
the question of conditional receipts.
From a study of this annotation and the wording of
the conditional receipt in the present case it appears rather
clearly that the conditional receipt here is of the "insurability" type.
The conditional receipt in the present case is similar to
the one in the Prince Case and there the court held the
conditional receipt to be a binding receipt or an "insurability" type and held in favor of the deceased insured.
The case of Machinery Inc. v. Anchor National Life Insurance Company, 434 F 2d and relied on by the defendant
in the lower court is not controlling because there the conditional receipt was found to be of the "approval" type.
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POINT VII
THE MOFRAD AND KILLPACK CASES ARE NOT
CONTROLLING.
The cases of Mofrad v. New York Ins. Co, 206 F 2d
491 (10 Cir. 1953) and Killpack v. National Old Line Ins.
Co., 229 F 2d 851 (10 Cir. 1956) both suffer from the same
disability. They are both cases that originated in the Federal District Court of Utah and went up on appeal to the
Tenth Circuit. As such, they can only rule what they believe the law to be. They cannot declare it. It is for the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah to declare what the
law is for the State of Utah. It should also be noted that
while both Mofrad and Killpack arise in Utah, the Federal
Court relies on the law of other jurisdictions to apply.
Therefore these two cases should not be recognized with the
same persuasive authority as those cases determined by the
state supreme court i.e. as of the same persuasiveness as
Prince.

CONCLUSION
The deposition of agent Holt is contradictory in many
respects but a reading of the entire deposition and taking it
as a whole together with the other depositions it is abundantly clear :
1.

That Fabrizio thought he was insured as did all
members of his family.

2.

That the application and conditional receipt are
ambiguous.
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3.

That Fabrizio met the conditions he was required to meet and was insurable at the time
of his death.

4.

That the blood pressure recheck was to establish premium rates and not insurability.

5.

That had Fabrizio not been accidentally killed
the defendant insurance company would have
issued an insurance policy.

For the reasons herein stated, plaintiff submits that
her motion for summary Judgment should have been
granted and that the trial corut's order granting defendant's motion for summary Judgment should be reversed,
or in the alternative the plaintiff should be granted a right
to trial on the issues.
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